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THOUGHTS ON
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS*
Marshall

J. Bregert

W

e celebrate 1986 as a year of anniversaries. LastJune we marked
the 40th anniversary of the Administrative Procedure Act.' From
now until 1989 is the long-running seminar and birthday party called
the Bicentennial of the Constitution. I find it particularly fitting to talk
today about the problem of political accountability and administrative
law, a subject that intertwines both documents, taking as my point of
departure the 100th anniversary of Woodrow Wilson's seminal article,
"The Study of Administration. 2 The article's theme was that the era of
constitution-making was over and that "administration" was coming to
replace politics as the principal activity and the principal problem of
government. Thus Wilson observed, "It is getting harder to run a
constitution than to frame one."3 He called for the development of "a
science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of
government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen
and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness."'
To Wilson, public administration was to be distinguished from politics. "The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed
from the hurry and strife of politics .... It is a part of political life only
as the methods of the counting-house are a part of the life of society....
Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be
suffered to manipulate its offices." 5
*Remarks at the Thirty-Third Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, December 4, 1986.
tChairman, Administrative Conference of the United States; Associate Professor of
Law, New York Law School (on leave); B.A., M.A. University of Pennsylvania, 1967; B.
Phil. (Oxon.), Oxford University, 1970; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1973.
15U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1982); See The Administrative ProcedureAct, A Fortieth Anniversary Symposium, 72 VA. L. REV. 215 (1986).
22 POL. Sc. Q. 197 (1887), reprintedin 56 POL. Sci. Q. 481 (1941) [hereinafter Wilson].
3
1d. at 484.
4
1d. at 485.
5Id. at 493-94.

400

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

Wilson's views on the separation of politics from administration were
not self-spawned. He drew heavily from continental thought and practice in public administration,6 contrasting in particular the nonpartisan
and professional public bureaucracy of Germany and England with the
American spoils system. The passage of civil service reform through
the Pendleton Act in 18831 undergirded the entire good government
effort. Indeed in some respects Wilson's essay represents a coherent
theory of public administration legitimizing civil service reform. It
stood for the very essence of Progressive politics.
But if public administration is viewed in part as a science, in part as a
business, what place did Wilson see for governmental accountability,
for democratic politics? He did not ignore the problem. Administrative
officials must be responsible for results, but the public must not meddle
with their choices as to details. "[Liarge powers and unhampered
discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility
... sayeth President Wilson. "The cook," Wilson tells us, "must be
trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires and
the ovens."'
It is easy to find ingenuousness in the thirty-one year old Wilson's
sharp distinction between politics and administration. He wrote in
what seems to us now a simpler era. The convulsions of civil war and
reconstruction were past. The great public issues of the day were the
tariff, the currency, and the opening of the American West for settlement and trade.
The young Wilson may have found support for his views in the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the same year his
essay was published. The ICC, whose 100th anniversary we mark next
year as well, was the first independent regulatory commission, created
of bipartisan membership to tackle the then seemingly intractable
problem of interstate transportation regulation.' It was created on

'Miewald, The Originsof Wilson's Thought, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: WOODROW
WILSON AND AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 18-21 (Rabin and Bowman eds. 1984).
'Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (Current version at 40 U.S.C. § 42 (1982)).
'Wilson, supra note 2, at 497-98.
9
j.ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
99-100 n. 54 (1986). It is interesting to note that in spite of its status as an independent
and bipartisan regulatory commission, the ICC was a very political animal even in its
early years. Congressional committees stayed in close touch with the Commission, and
the ICC nurtured political support both inside Congress and among the business
community. T. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 63 (1984). Thus while the science of
administration may have been the ICC's model, the tension between administration and
politics was present even from the start. Id.
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Wilsonian principles drawing its membership from wise men insulated
from narrow partisan concerns.'0
What is striking is not that Wilson viewed administration as an
apolitical science, but rather how long that vision persisted. Throughout the period from the turn of the century to the Second World War,
regulation expanded in fits and starts and new regulatory agencies
were created to carry out new programs." The model utilized during
this period was one of an apolitical body applying science or "expertise" to obtain an optimal result as measured by a consensus notion of
the "public interest." Indeed, to assure that regulation would be "above
politics," legislators generally assigned the task to independent commissions, like the ICC, whose membership was bipartisan and insulated
from removal. Further, Commission members were appointed for a
term of years that often could overlap administrations. In a typical but
more recent use of this model, Commodity Futures Trading Commission members are appointed to serve staggered five-year terms, and by
law no more than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party.'"
The apolitical paradigm led to the growth of the federal advisory
committee system. In 1939 there were 82 advisory committees, mostly
science-based. 3 Reliance on advisory committees made up of private
citizens or experts was later to raise questions about accountability for
government decisions, and led to passage of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. 4 While Wilson envisioned an unfettered administra"°S. Rep. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 267 (1886). Indeed, congressional testimony in
support of the new Commission foresaw a prominent membership. For example, A. B.
Miller testified in favor of a commission that would correct existing abuses "through
appointment of a Commission of the highest possible order, with adequate or large
compensation in order that the services of men of the most eminent ability may be
retained for that purpose." Id. Mr. Francis B. Thurber advocated salaries for commissioners that would "commend the services of first-class men." Id. at 286. In fact, the
salaries of the ICC commissioners were placed higher than all but Supreme Court
justices.
"See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1982)) (establishing the Federal Trade Commission); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-78hh (1982)
establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission).
127 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1982). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (governing terms for Federal
Trade Commissioners); 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982) (governing terms for Securities and
Exchange Commissioners); and 49 U.S.C. § 1902 (1982) (governing terms for members
of National Transportation Safety Board).
'"Gill, Permanent Advisory Committees in the Federal Government, 2 J. OF POL. 411-35
(1940).
4
Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. (1982)). As of the end of
FY 1984 over 928 committees, governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
funneled expert advice to a wide spectrum of agencies. FEDERAL ADvISORY COMMIrrEES,
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 1 (1985).
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tive bureaucracy, he nevertheless saw the bureaucracy as ultimately
accountable to its political superiors. Indeed, Wilson himself recognized the two ultimate truths about public administration: 1) that
administration cannot be carried on indifferent to or in defiance of
public opinion, and 2) that administration must be conducted in
accordance with broad policy choices made, not by the permanent
bureaucracy, but by "statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion
5
will be direct and inevitable."'
With some one hundred years of hindsight, it is easy to see that the
Wilsonian model has not prevailed in its entirety. In Wilson's favor, the
Civil Service is largely insulated from politics: the spoils system affects
only agency heads while the rank and file bureaucrats retain job security regardless of which party holds power. However, no one today
would credibly argue that politics is wholly distinct from administration. As Wilson observed, policy choices are not in the province of
bureaucrats. Rather, they reside in the executive and legislative
branches, and the distribution of power between the two is anything
but apolitical. Whether those who exercise power are statesmen or
politicians is another question.
If the apolitical expert administrative agency was, to a degree, oversold, it was probably due in large part to the need to establish the
credibility of administrativejustice and to defend its legitimacy against
the skepticism of a conservative bar which resisted any and all departures from thejudicial model. It must not be supposed, however, that
thoughtful defenders of the administrative state were unaware of the
degree to which regulation inevitably involved the making of value
judgments and decisions to prefer the interests of one group to those
of another. They knew perfectly well that, to quoteJustice Jackson, "It
is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the
self-interest of the regulated and that advantages from the regulation
commonly fall to others."" For this very reason James Landis argued
that basic politicaljudgments should be made at the congressional level
and not delegated to the agencies. Experience with the National Recovery Act, he observed, "points to the impossibility of delegating to the
administrative the responsibility of making policy from the very irresolution of the legislature."" There are organizational strengths in the
administrative model, but they do not "dispense with the ultimate

"5Wilson, supra note 2, at 500.
"Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
7

1 j. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

59 (1938).
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necessity of arriving at some conclusion based upon conscious selection
among available and competing postulates. When those postulates
have so enlisted the loyalties and faiths of classes of people, the choice,
to have that finality and moral sanction necessary for enforcement,
must, as a practical matter, be made according to a method which
resolves it as if it were one of power rather than one of judgment."''9
So too with agency independence. The decision in Humphrey's
Executor'" seemingly placed the Supreme Court's imprimatur on the
independent quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative regulatory commission.
But two years later the Brownlow Committee charged, in phrases
which have rung down through the years, that the independent commissions:
constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of the government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers.... The Congress
has found no effective way of supervising them, they cannot be controlled by
the President, and they are answerable to the courts only in respect to the
legality of their activities.'
Thus, the situation at the end of the 1930s found the apolitical
administrative ideal under attack from two sides. While conservatives,
led by the organized bar, urged that administrative agencies be required to behave more like courts, apostles of presidential authority
bewailed the lack of accountability in the independent commissions
and urged greater presidential control. After a truce imposed by
World War 1I, a rough accommodation was achieved which lasted for a
generation. The elements of this accommodation were, first and foremost, the Administrative Procedure Act, which sought to define the
extent to which agencies were expected to act like courts and the extent
to which they were expected to act like legislative bodies. It might be
argued that the APA's recognition of the policy element in certain
administrative decisions, particularly rulemaking, represented a departure from the Wilsonian model of scientific administration. But,
taken as a whole, the Act seems to me to represent a reaffirmation of
the notion of the expert technocratic agency, absorbing information,
ideas and argument from every side in order to achieve the most
rational synthesis.
The APA compromise reflected a deference to experts which
permeated much political theory of the postwar period. Democratic
' 81d.
"9 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
20

REPORT OF THE

(1937).

PRESIDENT'S

COMMirTEE

ON ADMINISTRATIVE

MANAGEMENT
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theorists like Daniel Bell' and Zbigniew Brzezinski 2 held that power in
post-industrial society will flow to a technocratic elite based in the
universities and the research lab. No less a high priest than John
Kenneth Galbraith concurred." Like Daniel Bell, many of these writers
were democratic pluralists. Nonetheless they revised their views to
hold that scientists 24 and planners alike should not be fettered by the
vagaries of the political process. Conservatives like Jacques Ellul foreswore democracy completely, given2 the need for apolitical decisionmaking in the technological society. 5
Unlike Wilson, these political theorists dealt little with the question
of accountability. The APA dealt with the question by providing for the
independence of hearing examiners (now administrative law judges)
and by restating the common law principles of judicial review. Soon,
however, the adequacy of those checks was questioned. These concerns
were voiced by the Brownlow Committee and addressed, at least to a
limited extent, in the round of reorganization plans which followed the
second Hoover Commission Report in 1955.6 These plans brought
about an increase in political accountability for the independents by
empowering the President to designate (and remove) the chairman of
each commission and by concentrating administrative functions in the
agency chairman.
The period of the late 1960s to the mid-1 970s saw a great expansion
in the scope and intensity of federal regulation. New programs and
agencies were created to deal with such problems as environmental
pollution, industrial safety and health, and the safety of consumer
products, and older agencies received new and broader grants of
rulemaking authority. 7 Unfortunately, this legislation too often failed
21

D. Bell, Notes on the Post-IndustrialSociety (1), 6 THE PUB. INTEREST 24, 27 (1967)
(predicting the importance of research in the new society). See also D. BELL, THE COMING
OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 339-68 (1973) (distinguishing politicians from technocrats); THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 3-32 (1976) (introducing disjunction between cultural realms); THE CRISIS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 46-80 (1981).

2'Brzezinski, America in the Technotronic Age, I ENCOUNTER 26 (1968) (noting that
science and technology already influence social behavior since they "are notoriously
unsympathetic
to simple, absolute formulas [of traditional thought]").
2
.SeeJ. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 291 (1967) (predicting increase in
number
of researchers and educators).
2
'D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 208-69 (1965); see also R. LAPP, THE NEW
PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE AND THE USES OF POWER 180-89 (1965).
2-J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 200-28 (1964); see also J. ELLUL, THE
POLITICAL ILLUSION 224-40 (1967).
2
1See,
e.g., Reorg. Plans of 1961, 5 U.S.C. app. (1982); see also Hoover Commission
Report: COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1955).
27
' See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-4335,
4341-4347 (1982) (granting broad power to regulate the environment); Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in
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to reflect Dean Landis' wise injunction against "delegating to the administrative the responsibility of making policy from the very irresolution of the legislature."2
A prime example is the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which
spelled out conflicting considerations to the agency rulemakers requiring the highest priority be given to matters of worker safety, on the one
hand, while also adding a "feasibility" test which some interpreted to
mean use of cost-benefit analysis. 9 The breadth and inherent conflict
of this statutory delegation led to divided Supreme Court decisions in
the Benzene3" and Cottondust cases," and a raising by Justice Rehnquist of the need for invocation of the delegation doctrine."
A reaction was inevitable, and it took several forms. First, there was a
call for more elaborate procedural safeguards than the notice-andcomment requirements of the APA. Subsequent statutes required socalled hybrid procedures which borrowed from techniques used in
adjudication. The Magnuson-Moss Act governing Federal Trade
Commission rulemaking was perhaps the best example of this
approach, which allowed the agency to issue sweeping industry-wide
rules governing trade practices, but only afterjumping through rigorous procedural hoops.3
scattered sections of 5, 15, 29, 42 and 49 U.S.C. (1982)) (granting broad power to
regulate working conditions); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5314,
5315; 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1982) (granting broad power to regulate consumer
products).
2
1Landis, supra note 17, at 59.
229 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (providing in pertinent part that "the Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment [from
exposure to toxic materials].") (emphasis added).
"°Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
[hereinafter the "Benzene" case].
3
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) [hereinafter the
"Cottondust" case]. In the Benzene case, the Court held that the statute did not give
OSHA the unbridled discretion to adopt standards that would create a risk-free workplace without regard to cost, 448 U.S. at 642; while the Court in the Cottondust case held
5 to 3 that the same statute did not require a cost-benefit analysis, 452 U.S. at 541.
"Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, 452 U.S. at 544, framed the issue as whether Congress,
in adopting the "feasibility" test, had unconstitutionally delegated to the Executive
Branch the authority to make "crucial policy choices" properly the task of the legislature.
Id. at 549.
"The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of
1980, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982). Its so-called hybrid procedures require compliance with
§ 553 informal rulemaking procedures as well as the addition of (I) publication of the
proposed text of the rule, alternatives, and the reason for the proposed rule; (2)
provisions for allowing interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments
on a public record; (3) hearings conducted by a hearing officer including allowance of
cross-examination relating to a disputed issue of material fact; (4) promulgation of a final
rule based on the record along with the statement of basis and purpose. ACUS Recoi-
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At the same time, the courts were reading new meaning into the
APA's requirement that agencies explain the basis and purpose of their
rules. Judicial review shifted from a fairly cursory inquiry into statutory authority to the so-called "hard look" at the entire rulemaking
process. The impact of the judicial "hard look" forced agencies to
devise procedures-where Congress had not already required themwhich would satisfy the courts that the agency had considered the
range of data and comments presented and that the agency's factual
determinations had a rational basis. Given the lawyer's preference for
reaching the truth through the adversary process, it is not surprising
that these procedures have tended to make rulemaking more like
adjudication. And, not coincidentally, they have tended to make the
decisionmaking process in appearance, if not in fact, more objective
and apolitical."
But while the courts were pulling the agencies in the direction of the
Wilsonian model of apolitical, scientific administration, the political
branches were pushing for more accountability. Congress sought to
make the administrative process more accountable to the legislative
branch through oversight hearings, the appropriations process, and
the legislative veto. And by controlling the pursestrings Congress controls much agency activity. A case in point is the tightening of the
Federal Trade Commission's leash in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Congress effectively halted controversial Commission action by reducing its budget at the same time it imposed even more stringent procedural requirements and removed its jurisdiction to act in certain
areas) 5 Similarly the Chadha 6 decision checked the legislative veto, at
least for the time being. Nonetheless Congress does not easily acquiesce. For example, legislation 7 introduced in the closing days of the
mendations 79-1, 79-5 and 80-1 address the Magnuson-Moss Trade Regulation Rulemaking procedures. (1 C.F.R. §§ 305.79-1, 79-5 and 80-1). See also Boyer, Trade
Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission, in 1980 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 33. The author concluded
that hybrid procedures did not effectively limit agency discretion, but rather contributed
to confusion and delay, and led to reversal of promulgated trade regulation rules on
appeal.
"An excellent discussion of the "hard-look" doctrine can be found in Sunstein,
Deregulationand the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 177. The author points out
that by requiring agencies to justify their actions, the courts are requiring a "technocratic
rationality" or a Wilsonian separation of administration from politics. Id. at 211.
' 5 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 57a

(1982).
"'INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional the legislative veto
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) which
authorized either House of Congress to disapprove the Attorney General's decision to
suspend deportation of an alien).
" . 2834, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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99th Congress would require direct congressional approval of most
foreign arms sales, placing Congress in the driver's seat rather than
limiting it to a "blocking" role. This legislation would obviate the effect
of Chadha on congressional approval of arms exports.
White House efforts to secure greater agency accountability to the
President have been more successful. Under Executive Orders
12,29138 and 12,498," the Office of Management and Budget has
performed a significant, yet controversial, role in reviewing and coordinating agency regulatory initiatives. The executive order program is
based on the perceptions that agency decisionmaking tends to be
uncoordinated and unnecessarily costly, that agency administrators
are not adequately accountable to the public or to the President, and
that the political heads of the agencies are too often the captives of their
own apolitical staffs.
The general idea of presidential coordination has received broad,
though by no means unanimous, approval from observers of the
administrative process, including that one-time foe of "political" administration, the American Bar Association.4" But OMB's coordinating
authority has given rise to questions about the nature of the process by
which it is exercised and, consequently, has inspired demands that that
process itself become more structured, more open and more apolitical. 4'
Last year our former chairman (now Chief Judge of the United
States Claims Court) Loren Smith, in a provocative article,42 took both
the courts and Congress to task for saddling the agencies with methods
"8Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
(1982).
431-34
3
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 92
(Supp. III 1985). Executive Orders No. 12,498 and No. 12,291, supra note 38, direct the
Office of Management and Budget to review all proposed and final regulations prior to
their issuance, and to publish annually agency plans for rulemaking. See DeMuth and
Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986)
(discussing OMB's oversight role).
'"Section of Administrative Law, American Bar Association, Report to the House of
Delegates. (Resolution 100, passed February 10, 1986.) The resolution found the Constitution's choice of a "unitary executive" justified presidential involvement in federal
agencies' rulemaking activities.
"'Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986). In response to congressional criticism and threatened
budget-slashing of its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), OMB
modified its regulatory review procedures, inter alia, to allow for disclosure of draft rules
and of relevant correspondence between OIRA and an agency. See Rovner, OMB's
Regulatory Activities Draw Fire in Congress, CONG. Q., 1339 (June 14, 1986). See also
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that
OMB could not lawfully delay promulgation of agency regulations beyond a statutory
deadline).
42
Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L. J. 427.
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and procedures unsuited to the basically politicaljudgments they were
making. He distinguished between "decisions of logic" and "decisions
of will" 43 and argued that it was fallacious and dysfunctional to insist
that the latter could be made or reviewed in an objective manner.
Accordingly, to the extent that government must undertake a given
task at all, Judge Smith would opt for greater political accountability
and, by implication, less science in administration. It is no surprise that
the focus on accountability parallels a concern for constitutional issues
of power allocation in the study of administrative law. Just as Wilson
denigrated robust readings of the concept of separation of powers for
fear it would lead to congressional hegemony, " today the Buckley 15 and
Synar4 6 decisions have honed the notion of separation of powers so as to
protect executive autonomy.
I will make no attempt to resolve these competing views of the
agency role. My goal is much more modest: to examine the implications of this debate for administrative procedure and for the role of the
Administrative Conference.
It is clear that one's view of the appropriate role of the administrative agency must shape one's notion of what is good procedure.
If one shares with Judge Smith the view that many or most exercises of delegated discretion are simply decisions of will, one is naturally skeptical of the value of procedural requirements which force the
decisionmaker to jump through hoops tojustify his decisions. Even so,
decisions of will may be informed or uninformed, and requirements
designed to ensure some degree of exposure of the decisionmaker to
the facts and the arguments cannot be wholly impertinent. But, if
agency action is viewed primarily as scientific and apolitical, one would
want procedures that emphasize comprehensive and accurate factgathering. If the agency is viewed primarily as an arbiter or broker
among competing interests, the emphasis might be on ensuring openness and removing barriers to participation. If bureaucratic selfaggrandizement is the motive force for agency decisionmaking, what
counts is simplified procedure that lowers an agency's transaction costs.
"Id.
44

at 430.
Wilson, Congressional Government, Johns Hopkins University (1885), cited in Johns
Hopkins paperback edition (1981). See, e.g., discussion at 50-56 and 205-07.
'15Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
"Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). Buckley and Synar illustrate the difficulty in
distinguishing the legislative and executive functions. Thus, in Buckley, the Court invalidated congressional involvement in appointment of Federal Election Commission memhers as interference with the executive function. 424 U.S. at 140. And in Synar the Court
found unconstitutional the delegation of certain powers to the Comptroller General on
similar grounds. Id. at 3194. See Cass, Looking With One Eye Closed: The Twilight of
Administrative Law, 1986 DUKE L.J. 238, 251, nn. 71 & 72.
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The administrative universe is so variegated and so vast that empirical support can doubtless be found for all of these theories of administrative behavior. Agencies sometimes behave in a manner consistent
with the Wilsonian ideal, sometimes they reach their conclusions for
political reasons, and once in a while they even act out of bureaucratic
self-interest. And, indeed, there are doubtless occasions on which these
interests coincide. Good government can, after all, be good politics,
particularly if one has the luxury of time enough before the next
election for policies to bear fruit. Bureaucratic self-interest, on the
other hand, is rarely served by identification with a policy which has
been a visible failure.
Some have argued that we cannot talk of "good procedure" where
there is no consensus as to what such procedure is supposed to accomplish. Indeed, there are some who have gone further, claiming that
such a consensus is impossible and that the effort to identify common
assumptions of fairness and regularity in a legal order is a blind by
which special interests promote particular substantive results."7 That
denigration of procedure as inextricably result-oriented is akin to the
savaging of the notion of the "rule of law" now underway by critical
legal scholars and others.48 Indeed, on this view, procedure is simply
part of a political struggle,4 ' process merely a tool to mask and legiti5
mate disparate power relations in society. 1
This attempt to denigrate the effort to improve legal and administrative procedure is at best mistaken and at worst mischievous?' For, to
97j. BARBALET, MARX'S CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL THEORY 151-158 (1983) (discussing
role of state in a capitalist society); M. BROWN, PRODUCTION OF SOCIETY: A MARXIAN
FOUNDATION FOR SOCIAL THEORY 94 (1986) (discussing political dimension of class
struggle).
8
The attack on the rule of law is an attack of the very possibility of neutral principles
or, otherwise put, consensus values. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. (1979); Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351

(1973). See also M. Horowitz, Book Review, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?
86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977).
'The extreme formulation is that of Professor Morton Horowitz: "anyone who
attempts to find a realm of neutral craft and law distinct from politics is lying to himself."
Morton Horowitz: A Critical Look at Studying Law, HARV. L. RECORD (Nov. 19, 1982).
5
In this respect procedure can be seen as part of the legal ideology of formalism, 1-3,
M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 699 (G. Roth and R. Wittich, eds. 1968). See also
Trubeck, M. Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wisc. L. REV. 720, 748-9
(arguing that legalism legitimizes the political structure of capitalist society).
5
See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJusticeand ProfessionalEthics, 1978
WIsc. L. REV. 29 at 45, 48. How to classify the following is left to the reader: "Procedural
rules permit people whose claims have no substantive validity to put others to the risk of
proof . . .[enabling] people to frustrate enforcement by delaying and by imposing
expenses on their adversaries." Id.
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any interpretive community2 based on western values, good procedure increases the likelihood ofjust determinations. In many instances
it supports efficiency as well as fairness in the administrative process.
There is such a thing as good procedure in the sense I have defined.
There are efficient ways to conduct proceedings, there are more and
less useful ways to assemble and present relevant information. While
fairness is to a certain extent subjective,, there are principles upon
which a consensus about the meaning of "fair procedure" can be
formed. The opportunity to object to, or to seek to influence, proposed
government action is one such principle. The Conference-and especially Kenneth Culp Davis, a prominent member-has long supported
use of notice-and-comment procedure in rulemaking. Thus, the Conference recommended repeal of the APA's proprietary exemption
from Section 553's notice-and-comment requirements, and most agen53
cies voluntarily decline to invoke it.
However, there can be too much
of a good thing, even of procedures creating rights to contest agency
action. A good example of this is the Administrative Conference's 1972
warning to Congress against mandating trial-type procedures for making rules of general applicability. 4 Congress failed to heed this warning
in the Magnuson-Moss Act,'55 and I think there is general agreement
that this particular experiment in hybrid rulemaking procedures was
an egregious failure.
The examples in the preceding paragraph illustrate the importance
of procedure to both the efficiency and fairness of the administrative
process. As Judge Prettyman has observed: "Some important facets of
life are merely procedure. Due Process of law is procedure, and so is
getting married and cutting the cards in a bridge game."' Indeed, if
put to the choice, as Justice Jackson argued in a broader context, one
might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good
faith by our common law procedures than under our substantive law
57
enforced by Soviet procedural practices.
Good procedure acts to limit the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies. Both those who desire more government regulation and
52

Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 746-7 (1982).
ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Eliminationof CertainExemptionsfrom the APA Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1987). See also Administrative Conference of the
United
States, A Guide to FederalAgency Rulemaking 26-7 (1983).
54
ACUS Recommendation 72-5, The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative
Rulemaking,
1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1987).
"5See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56Prettyman, Some BroaderAspects of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 17
ADMIN.
L. REv. 48, 60 (1964).
5
'Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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those who desire less are in favor of procedural checks on agency
discretion. Perhaps this is one reason it is easier to obtain a consensus
on procedure than on substance. To quote Professor Cass, "In some
measure process agreement is easier than substantive agreement because people make different (and mutually optimistic) predictions
about the probable outcome of a given process. In some measure,
process agreement suggests that most people value the use of certain
''
procedures in particular circumstances. 15
It is quite true that in the political process, whether on Capitol Hill or
in the agency, the "best" procedure may be traded off for a substantive
value, but this does not mean that the effort to identify the best has
been a wasted effort. If nothing else, it has contributed to the operation
of an efficient political market.
The regnant effort to ensure "good" procedure in this country is, as
already stated, the Administrative Procedure Act. The Administrative
Conference, we must remember, was born in the shadow, as it were, of
the Administrative Procedure Act. While the legislation establishing
the present Conference was enacted in 1964, it took as a model the
temporary conferences of 1953 and 1961-62.5 It was intended to be a
nonpartisan, nonpolitical convocation of "experts" in administrative
law-a law commission, if you will, for administrative procedures.
Indeed, legal systems as diverse as those of England, Australia, and
France utilize the concept of a conference albeit under different nomenclature and with varying responsibilities.'
58

Cass, supra note 46, at 254-55, n. 27.
1ln 1953, the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure convened to
examine the issues of delay, expense, and volume of records in some adjudicatory and
rulemaking proceedings. Recommendations of the Conf. on Admin. Procedure, 15 F.R.D. 217,
219 (1953). In 1961 a second temporary Administrative Conference was appointed, and
charged with improving existing administrative procedures. It issued some twenty
recommendations: one, proposing creation of a permanent Administrative Conference,
resulted in the Conference's birth.
Both of these conferences were preceded by the suggestion in Administrative Procedure
in Government Agencies, Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., (1941) (FinalReport of the Atty.
Gen.'s Comm. on Admin. Procedure)that an office of Federal Administrative Procedure be
established to "devote attention to the agencies' common procedural problems." Id. at
123. The report noted that "knowledge and regularization of procedures should go far
toward creating that confidence in the administrative process which is necessary for its
successful functioning." Id. at 124. This thought echoes Woodrow Wilson's views that
agency administrators must be responsible to the body politic. See supra note 2, at 500.
6
Thus, Great Britain's Council on Tribunals has responsibility for adjudication, but
not rulemaking. Australia's "experts" are known as the Administrative Review Council.
And in France, the Section of Reports and Studies of the Council of State exercises
authority comparable to but probably exceeding that of the Administrative Conference.
See generally, L. BROWN and J. GARNER, FRANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 42-51 (3rd Ed.
1983) (noting the prestige of the Section and the force of its suggestions).
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The Conference, since its inception, has engaged in efforts to refine
and improve administrative procedure, including reforms in rulemaking, the adjudication process, internal separation of functions, and
other issues directly related to the functioning of the APA. However,
the need for good procedure exists in other areas where substantive
concerns have been so great that the focus on the "right" procedure to
implement substantive rules has only just begun.
I believe that the Administrative Conference's emphasis on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) represents an effort to respond to new
ideas and go beyond the strict confines of the APA. We have recently
begun several projects inquiring into various possible agency uses of
ADR. Conference Recommendation 86-3 calls rather broadly for legislation authorizing voluntary arbitration of many agency disputes,
and for agencies to take greater advantage of mediation, minitrials,
settlementjudges, organizational streamlining and other means now at
their disposal to encourage settlement of many proceedings. Previous
research projects considering ADR include studies leading to recommendations for using negotiated rulemaking, negotiating Superfund
cleanups, making agency handling of tort claims less adversarial, and
mediating grant disputes and an evaluation of expedited procedures
for employee grievances at the Merit Systems Protection Board.6 In
December 1986, the Conference adopted a follow-on recommendation that gives specific, practical advice on procedures for obtaining the
services of neutrals.12
The Conference's pioneering research and recommendations provided the impetus for experimentation by agencies with regulatory
negotiation (commonly referred to as "reg neg"). This procedure has
6
These include ACUS Recommendations 82-4 and 85-5, Proceduresfor Negotiating
Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.82-4 and 85-5 (1987); 84-4, Negotiated Cleanup of
Hazardous Waste Sites under CERCLA, I C.F.R. § 305.84-4; 84-7, Administrative Settlement
of Tort and Other Monetary Claims Against the Government, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7; and 82-2,
Resolving Disputes underFederalGrantPrograms, 1C.F.R. § 305.82-2. These recommendations were based in part on the following consultant reports: Harter, NegotiatingRegulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1 (1982), 1982 ACUS 301; Perritt,
Negotiated Rulemaking Before FederalAgencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1625 (1986), 1985 ACUS 637;
Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L. J. 261,
1984 ACUS 263; PhilipJ. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proceduresand
the Administrative Process, 1986 ACUS 165; Bermann, Administrative Handlingof Monetary

Claims: Tort Claims at the Agency Level, 35

CASE WESTERN RES.

L. REv. 509 (1985), 1984

ACUS 639; Steinberg, FederalGrant Dispute Resolution, 1982 ACUS 137, published in 5
MEZINES, STEIN AND GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
62

§ 53 (1987).

Acquiring The Services of "Neutrals'forAlternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.86-8 (1987), based on a pro bono report to the Conference by George D. Ruttinger,
of the law firm of Crowell & Moring.
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since emerged in a few agencies as a leading alternative to more
traditional rulemaking techniques. Negotiated rulemaking is based on
the premise that if representatives of the different interests affected by
a regulatory program are given the opportunity early in the process to
confront each other and discuss the problems that have prompted an
agency to consider instituting a rulemaking proceeding, they may
achieve, through structured negotiation, consensus on an acceptable
rule that would, ideally, accommodate fairly the main concerns of the
various interests while recognizing the legitimate needs of other
affected parts of society. Rulemaking that emphasizes consensus is very
likely to reduce the number and complexity of court challenges.
The Conference recommended adoption of negotiated rulemaking
procedures in some detail in 1982, and established guidelines for
identifying regulatory problems that might be conducive to a negotiated solution. In 1985, the Conference reexamined, and elaborated
on, its earlier recommendation in the light of three years of agency
experience. I am pleased to tell you that "reg neg" has been tried by the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Several other agencies (including the Department of the Interior,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Federal Trade Commission)
now are beginning to employ the procedure. 3 Both the FAA and the
EPA report significant success with negotiated rulemaking. The FAA's
recently completed successful proceeding using "reg neg" on flight and
rest time requirements for airline pilots followed three contentious,
and unfruitful, attempts over a ten-year period to revise a longstanding rule that had become outmoded. Among the several agencies,
EPA has been most active, using the process with over half-a-dozen
proposed rules. For example, it has issued a negotiated rule governing
the exemption of federal and state agencies from certain requirements
for the use of pesticides under emergency conditions.
Negotiated rulemaking, in particular, is an attempt to use market
techniques to secure a generally satisfactory, rather than a scientific,
result. We are pleased with the growth in interest and in use of negotiated rulemaking. And we are excited about the potential for agency
use of minitrials and arbitration as well.
Good procedures, however, still require political will to be implemented. The continuing saga of our "race to the courthouse" legislation is a case in point. Administrative Conference Recommendation
6

C. Pou, Jr., Governmental Uses of Alternative Dispute Resolution,

LOCAL LAw NEWSLErER 1,

17-8 (Winter 1986).

URBAN, STATE AND
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80-5, Eliminatingor Simplifying the "Race to the Courthouse"in Appealsfrom
Agency Action, " proposes random selection of a court of appeals when
parties seeking judicial review of agency action file petitions for review
with different courts. Under current law, 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a), the court
in which the first petition is filed is the forum court, inciting the "race to
the courthouse." Everyone agrees our recommendation is a sound
solution to the underlying problem. However, in the last session of
Congress, despite early passage in the House 5 and diligent educational
efforts by our staff and by our friends at the ABA, the bill encountered
a series of procedural misadventures on the Senate side. Eventually it
fell victim to the unwillingness of the House to accept non-germane
amendments which had been added in the Senate."" Previous attempts
to secure legislative passage have been similarly fruitless. Legislation
introduced in 1980, 1982,' and 19838 all failed for reasons not related
to the proposed statutory change. I guess we are still building the
political will necessary to advance this good government bill that last
step.
Several recent pieces of legislation point up the continuing need for
the Administrative Conference and suggest areas of future conference
research. Immigration reform legislation has at last been passed by
Congress. 9 The procedural problems in administering the new statute,
particularly the procedure for adjudicating tens if not hundreds of
thousands of applications under the bill's amnesty program, promise
to be substantial. The Conference has sponsored some research into
the basic administrative law issues underlying the immigration program' and we anticipate the need to do more in the years to come.
Legislation to deal with fraudulent claims in federal programs was
also recently enacted.7' The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act includes a provision for administrative imposition of civil penalties that,
I1C.F.R. § 305.80-5 (1987).
"131 CONG. REC. H3136 (daily ed. May 13, 1985).
'"'132
CONG. REC. S17043 (daily ed. October 17, 1986).
7
3 Legislation introduced included H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) and as part of
the Regulatory Procedure Act of 1982, H.R. 439, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
aH.R. 5365, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
'91mmigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

7
See Verkuil, A Study oflmmigrationProcedures,3 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1141 (1984); 1984
ACUS 987; Leibowitz, ComparativeAnalysis of Immigration in Key Developed Countries in

Relation to ImmigrationReform and ControlLegislation in the United States, 7 HUM. RTs. L.J. 1

(1986); Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration
Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297 (1986); 1985 ACUS 505.
7
'Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, contained in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986).
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as was noted by the Senate sponsors, was derived from Conference
Recommendation 72-6, 7 promulgated under Chairman Scalia .71 We
may be called upon to help agencies administer this statute. Finally,
7'
Medicare legislation enacted in the closing days of the 99th Congress
provides claimants, for the first time, with rights to an administrative
hearing and to judicial review in Part B [outpatient] cases. Our extensive study of the Medicare appeals process 75- indicates that a plethora of
procedural questions remain to be studied in this important program.
The administration of these statutes will determine their success or
failure, for efficiency and fairness in their execution is essential to their
acceptance by those regulated. In all these areas the Conference has an
important role to play. Our body of advice for Congress and the
agencies is more relevant and useful than ever.
One can draw various conclusions about Wilson's vision of a dichotomy between administration and politics, but one cannot deny that
even one hundred years later Wilson's ideas retain relevance, as we at
the Administrative Conference continue to focus on the science of
administration. It is by the slow accumulation of knowledge and of
experience that we are most likely to affect, for the better, the course of
administration law.

7ACUS Recommendation 72-6, Civil Money Penaltiesas a Sanction, I C.F.R. § 305.72-6
(1987).
7
See 132 CONG. REC. S 13005 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986) (reprinting statement of Senator
Cohen).
74
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986).
5
7 Kinney, The MedicareAppeals System for Coverageand Payment Disputes 1986 ACUS 339,
and Recommendation No. 86-5, Medicare Appeals, I C.F.R. § 305.86-5 (1987).

